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THE SAT IS NO LAUGHING MATTER FOR SE/NFEL. ISSUES
OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND FAIR USE IN
CASTLE ROCK ENTERTAINMENT, INC. v.
CAROL PUBLISHING GROUP, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1994, when Carol Publishing Group, Inc. ("Carol Publish-
ing") released The Seinfeld Aptitude Test ("The SAT"), a trivia book
depicting the characters and events in the Seinfeld television series,
Castle Rock Entertainment ("Castle Rock"), the copyright holder in
Seinfeld, was not laughing.' After warning Carol Publishing to stop
publication of The SAT, Castle Rock filed an action for federal copy-
right infringement.2
Copyright law recognizes creative intellectual activity as critical
to the well-being of society.3 Copyright law was specifically de-
signed to stimulate activity and progress in the arts for the intellec-
tual enrichment of all individuals.4 The monopoly created by a
copyright rewards authors for their creative efforts while conferring
a benefit on the public.5 Although copyright protection is neces-
sary to achieve these goals, the scope of the protection must not be
so broad as to stifle creativity. 6 In furtherance of this goal, the doc-
1. See Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d
132, 136 (2d Cir. 1998).
2. See id.
3. SeePierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 I-IARv. L. REv. 1105, 1109
(1990). Leval recognizes copyright law as a practical device that provides benefits
for authors and artists. See id. According to Leval, this benefit is conferred in
order to promote the intellectual and practical enrichment that emanates from
creative and innovative activity. See id. Leval concludes that copyright law is there-
fore necessary to attain this goal. See id.
4. See id. at 1107. This goal is met by allowing authors and artists to receive
the rewards of their creative thoughts. See Leval, supra note 3, at 1107. Further,
copyright law is created to augment knowledge, not inhibit it. See id. Rights fur-
thered by copyright law are created to give a return to those who have contributed
to this arena of knowledge. See id.
5. See id. at 1108 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 545-46 (1985)).
6. See id. at 1109. Monopoly protection that interfered with the creation of
innowitive ide would strtangle the process. St' leval, su ra note 3, at 1109. Three
copyright doctrines address this problem. See id. The first is the rule that copy-
right only protects expression, not the author's ideas. See id. (citing Harper & Row,
471 U.S. at 547). The second doctrine states that facts are not protected. See id
(citing Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1980)).
The third doctrine is fair use, which protects "secondary creativity" as an appropri-
ate aim of copyright. See id at 1110.
(405)
1
Sous: The SAT Is No Laughing Matter for Seinfeld: Issues of Copyright I
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
406 VILLANovA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
trine of fair use acts as a safeguard to limit the scope of copyright
monopoly.7
Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc. ad-
dresses two intriguing aspects of copyright law: the Copyright Act of
1976 ("Copyright Act") and the fair use doctrine. 8 The Copyright
Act protects copyright owners against unauthorized copying by al-
lowing them to bring copyright infringement actions.9 The fair use
doctrine provides an affirmative defense to copyright infringement
when the copyright's goal would otherwise be thwarted. 10 In this
case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed a copyright in-
fringement claim and the fair use defense, and granted relief for
the claim." The court evaluated the issues by balancing the need
to protect an established copyright against the need to protect crea-
tive expression. 12
This Note examines the Second Circuit's decision in Castle
Rock, which rejected the fair use defense, holding that The SAT in-
fringed on Castle Rock's copyrights in Seinfeld. The second section
of this Note details the facts giving rise to the producers' claims
against the author and publisher of The SAT.13 The third section
7. SeeLeval, supra note 3, at 1110. Fair use is a necessary element of copyright
monopoly. See id. The doctrine of fair use sets forth principles that focus on using
copyright to stimulate productive thought without decreasing motivation for crea-
tivity. See id. Fair use is an affirmative defense to the claim of copyright infringe-
ment, acting as a significant limitation on copyright monopoly. See Benjamin Ely
Marks, Copyright Protection, Privacy Rights, and The Fair Use Doctrine: The Post-Salinger
Decade Reconsidered, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1376, 1377 (1997) (citing Harper &Row, 471
U.S. at 561 (treating fair use as affirmative defense)).
8. See Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d
132, 136 (2d Cir. 1998).
9. See The Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act), 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803
(1994); see also Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1997) (precluding
summaryjudgment on musician's claim that musical composition "Phantom Song"
infringed on plaintiffs copyrighted song "Till You" where "Phantom Song" was
strikingly similar to "Till You"); Feist Publication, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (asserting that publisher's use of listings in utility's white
pages failed to meet constitutional or statutory requirements for copyright protec-
tion). See generally Jeannette R. Busek, Copyright Infringement: A Proposal for a New
Standard for Substantial Similarity Based on the Degree of Possible Expressive Variation, 45
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1777, 1782-85 (1998) (explaining Copyright Act and copyright
infringement).
10. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting
U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). The ultimate test of fair use is whether the copyright
law's goal of "[p]romot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts" is fulfilled.
See id.
11. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 132. For the specific relief granted by the
court, see infra note 32 and accompanying text.
12. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 141.
13. For a discussion of the facts and procedural background of Castle Rock, see
infra notes 19-33 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 6: p. 405
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discusses the pertinent statutes and case law relating to copyright
infringement and the fair use defense, with a specific discussion of
the Copyright Act. 14 The fourth section describes how the court
arrived at its decision to affirm Castle Rock's copyright infringe-
ment claim and to reject the fair use defense. 15 The fifth section
analyzes the court's reasoning and offers a critique of the "substan-
tial similarity" test used in copyright infringement disputes.16 In ad-
dition, the fifth section explores the four-factor analysis employed
in fair use claims.17 Finally, this Note discusses the impact of Castle
Rock on the need for copyright protection against secondary users
who unfairly copy an original author's creative work, as well as the
effect of the absence of a bright-line rule in the fair use doctrine.18
II. FACTS
The Castle Rock litigation involved the alleged copyright in-
fringement of the Seinfeld television series ("Seinfeld') by the pub-
lisher of a trivia quiz book that tested its readers' recollection of
scenes from Seinfeld.19 The plaintiff, Castle Rock, is the producer
and copyright owner of every episode of Seinfeld.20 The defendants
are Beth Golub, the author, and Carol Publishing, the publisher of
The SAT.21 The SAT is a 132-page book with 643 trivia questions
about the characters depicted in the television episodes of
Seinfeld.22 The book uses eighty-four out of the eighty-six Seinfeld
14. For an analysis of prior cases dealing with copyright infringement and fair
use, see infra notes 56-129 and accompanying text.
15. For an examination of the Second Circuit's rationale in Castle Rock, see
infra notes 130-67 and accompanying text.
16. For a critical analysis of the court's holding and reasoning in Castle Rock,
including the "substantial similarity" test, see infra notes 168-218.
17. For a critical analysis of the court's holding and reasoning in Castle Rock,
including the four-factor analysis, see infra notes 168-218 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the potential ramifications of this decision, see infra
notes 219-33 and accompanying text.
19. See Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d
132, 135 (2d Cir. 1998).
20. See id. The television series involves the "tribulations" of four adult friends
living in New York City: Jerry Seinfeld, George Costanza, Elaine Benes, and Cosmo
Kramer. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id. The book contains 211 multiple choice questions, 93 matching
questions, and several short-answer questions. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 135. The
questions are arranged according to difficulty. See id. The five levels are: "Wuss
Questions," "This, That, and the Other Questions," "Atomic Wedgie Questions,"
and "Master of Your Domain Questions." Id, An example of a level one question
representative of the questions throughout The SAT is: "[to impress a woman,
George passes himself off as: a) a gynecologist; b) a geologist; c) a marine biolo-
gist; [or] d) a meteorologist." I.
407
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episodes, of which forty-one questions or answers include dialogue
from Seinfeld.23 Each question and correct answer originate from a
"fictional moment" in Seinfeld 24 Additionally, the name "Seinfeld'
appears on the front cover of The SAT, while a disclaimer on the
back cover states that The SAT "has not been approved or licensed
by any entity involved in creating or producing Seinfeld."25 Golub
designed The SAT by taking notes and using videotapes of the
Seinfeld episodes shown on television.2 6
The publication of The SAT did not produce a challenge at
first.27 However, Castle Rock ultimately objected to The SAT's publi-
cation because it has been careful when marketing products that
are related to Seinfeld.28 Castle Rock asserted that it would pursue
an independent marketing strategy for products related to Seinfeld,
including the publication of Seinfeld-related books.2 9
In November 1994, Castle Rock informed the defendants of its
potential copyright infringement claim. 30 In February 1995, as a
result of the defendants' failure to comply with Castle Rock's warn-
23. See id. at 136. The number of episodes The SAT draws from was close to
the number of episodes broadcast at the time The SAT was published. See Castle
Rock, 150 F.3d at 136.
24. See id. at 135. The episode most often used in The SAT was "The Cigar
Store Indian." Id. The SAT contained 20 questions that directly quoted between
3.6% and 5.6% of the episode (defendants' and plaintiffs estimations). See id.
25. Id. at 136. The covers of The SAT also have pictures of the Seinfeld actors.
See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 136. The front cover, with the title "The Seinfeld Apti-
tude Test," explains the book as a composite of "[h]undreds of spectacular ques-
tions of minute details from TV's greatest show about absolutely nothing." Id. On
the back cover is the following paragraph:
[I]f you think you know the answers - and really keep track of Seinfeld
minutiae - challenge yourself and your friends with these 550 trivia ques-
tions and 10 extra matching quizzes. No, The Seinfeld Aptitude Test
can't tell you whether you're Master of Your Domain, but it will certify
your status as King or Queen of Seinfeld trivia. So twist open a Snapple,
double-dip a chip, and open this book to satisfy your between-episode
cravings.
Id.
26. See id. Golub considered The SAT to be a "natural outgrowth" of Seinfeld
and, like Seinfeld, was "devoted to the trifling, picayune and petty annoyances en-
countered by the show's characters on a daily basis." Id.
27. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 136. The National Broadcasting Corporation
(NBC), the broadcaster of Seinfeld, asked the defendants for copies of the trivia
book to use as a promotion with the television program. See iL The executive
producer of Seinfeld called The SAT "a fun little book." Id. In addition, there was
evidence that Seinfelds audience grew after publication of The SAT. See id.
28. See id. Castle Rock rejected many proposals from publishers who wished
to create projects based on Seinfeld See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 136. Castle Rock
licensed only one Seinfeld book called "The Entertainment Weekly Seinfeld Com-
panion" and a CD-ROM product about Seinfeld scenes. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
[Vol. 6: p. 405
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ing by continuing to publish The SAT, Castle Rock filed an action
for infringement under federal copyright law.3 1 Both parties moved
for summary judgment; the district court granted summary judg-
ment for Castle Rock on the copyright claim, and Carol Publishing
and Golub appealed.32 The Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision, holding that The SAT took sufficient protected ex-
pression from Seinfeld and, thereby, infringed on Castle Rock's
copyrights. 33
III. BACKGROUND
The primary issue in Castle Rock was whether Castle Rock could
prove the two elements required to establish a prima facie case of
copyright infringement.3 4 The Copyright Act 35 creates a federal
claim for copyright infringement that protects authors and artists
from unauthorized reproduction of their creative expressions.36
The second issue in Castle Rock was whether the fair use excep-
tion included in the Copyright Act precluded an infringement
claim. 37 The fair use exception permits a second author to create a
new work based on the author's original for the public benefit, de-
31. See id. Castle Rock also filed a state law unfair competition action. See
Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 136.,
32. See id. The district court held that the defendants had violated the plain-
tiffs copyrights in Seinfeld and furthermore, held that this type of copying did not
qualify as fair use. See Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 955
F. Supp. 260, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) [Castle Rock 1]. The court denied summaryjudg-
ment to both parties on the unfair competition claim. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at
136-37. On the copyright infringement claim, the district court awarded Castle
Rock approximately $403,000 and enjoined the defendants from publishing The
SAT. See id. In addition, the district court ordered the defendants to destroy all
copies of The SAT that were in their possession. See id.
33. See id. at 146.
34. See id. at 137.
35. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803 (1994). For the relevant text of the Act, see infra
notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
36. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 137. The Copyright Act confers on the copy-
right owners the exclusive right to control the reproduction and copying of their
copyrighted works. See Alexandra Lyras, Incidental Artwork in Television Scene Back-
grounds: Fair Use or Copyright Infringement?, 2 FoRDHAM ENT. MEDIA & INTELL. PROP.
L.F. 159, 165 (1992).
37. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 141. One commentator suggests that the fair
use doctrine is a rule of reason by which the facts of each case establish the equi-
ties. See Adrienne J. Marsh, Fair Use and New Technology: The Appropriate Standards to
Apply, 5 CoARozo L. REv. 635, 643 (1984). The fair use doctrine provides a certain
type of guidance for the public, without which copyright protection would have a
"chilling effect" on prospective users. See id. This effect is contrary to the purpose
of copyright law, which is to promote the progress of the arts and science through
the distribution of knowledge. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
5
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spite the first author's copyright.3 8 The difficulty in determining
whether a particular case constitutes fair use of a copyrighted work
is due to the case-by-case analysis employed by the courts. 39 This
difficulty is magnified by the existence of a precarious balance be-
tween protecting authors' rights of original expression and promot-
ing public education and creative exchange. 40
A. Copyright Infringement
In 1976, Congress enacted the Copyright Act.4 1 The Copyright
Act embodies the primary and secondary goals of copyright law. 42
The primary goal is to stimulate widespread production of artistic
works. 43 The goal of encouraging the dissemination of works re-
38. See Marks, supra note 7, at 1381. For a detailed discussion of the fair use
doctrine, see infra notes 74-129 and accompanying text.
39. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 141 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994)). Courts are required to avoid a strict application of
the copyright statute. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577. The fair use examples pro-
vided by the Copyright Act serve only as guidance on how to recognize fair use but
do not control the fair use analysis. See id. at 577-78.
40. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283, 285 (1996). The problem with copyright law is determining where exclusive
rights terminate and public access commences. See id. For instance, if copyright is
too narrow, authors will have less incentive to produce creative works, but if copy-
right is too broad, copyright owners will use more censorial control over existing
works. See id.
41. See Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act), 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803 (1994);
Marks, supra note 7, at 1377-79 (explaining briefly Congress' intention in enacting
Copyright Act). A significant amount of the legal theory that forms the American
copyright law comes from English statutes. See Douglas Reid Weimer, Digital Audio
Recording Technology: Challenges to American Copyright, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 455, 459
(1990). In 1783, the Continental Congress encouraged the states to enact copy-
right legislation. See id. (citing L. PAT=ERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPEC-
TIVE 3-4 at 183 (1968)). As a result of the diverse state laws, the Framers of the
Constitution gave the legislative branch control over copyrights. See id. at 459-60.
Subsequently, the power to regulate copyrights was granted to Congress. See id. at
460. Over the years, Congress enacted many copyright statutes to keep pace with
technological changes in society. See id. A recent revision of copyright law in 1976
by the Copyright Act delineated the specific rights of copyright owners. See Wei-
mer, supra, at 460.
42. See Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory,
43 UCLA L. REv. 1, 6 (1995) (explaining that knowledge of both sets of goals is
necessary for understanding roles of accessibility and commercialization in copy-
right theory).
43. See id, (citing 1 PAUL GOLDSrEIN, COPYRIGHT § 1.1 (1989)); see also Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (explaining
that "the primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but
'[tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts'"). These goals are man-
dated by the Enabling Clause from which the Copyright Act derives its power. See
Kreiss, supra note 42, at 6-7. The Constitution authorizes Congress "to promote
the Progress of Science by securing for limited times to Authors the exclusive right
to their respective Writings." Id. at 7 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). The
[Vol. 6: p. 405
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quires striking a balance between the rights of authors and the priv-
ileges of the users of copyrighted works. 44 The Copyright Act
avoids underprotection and overprotection of an author's work by
limiting the scope of copyright protection to an author's expression
and by employing the fair use doctrine. 45
In enacting the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress also had sec-
ondary goals.46 The Copyright Act protects an author's privacy and
renders control of the right of first publication to the author.47
The Act reflects a harmonization of the American copyright system
and the dual goals of copyright law: the promotion of creative
works and the protection of an author's privacy. 48
Generally, the Copyright Act grants copyright owners a collec-
tion of exclusive rights.49 Section 106 of the Copyright Act specifi-
cally grants authors the exclusive right to reproduce copyrighted
works in the form of copies and the right to make derivative
works.50 In order to prove copyright infringement the owner of the
valid copyright must show some form of unauthorized copying. 51
Demonstration that the work was actually copied creates a prima
facie case of infringement. 52 In addition, to meet the elements of a
copyright infringement claim, the copying must be "an improper or
constitutional language is aimed at the promotion of learning and knowledge. See
id
44. See id. at 8. Copyright law has to maintain an author's incentive to create
while still allowing other authors to create new works based on the original works.
See id.
45. See Kreiss, supra note 42, at 8-9. The Copyright Act protects an author's
expression but not an author's ideas, processes, and methods. See id. at 8. For
example, a rock and roll song is protected as expression, but the ideas of the rock
and roll era are not protected. See id. at 9. The fair use doctrine is a way of
preventing underprotection and overprotection by allowing for a variety of valua-
ble uses. See i. For instance, a scholar is permitted to quote parts of a novel in
order to critique an author's work. See id.
46. See Kreiss, supra 42, at 9.
47. See id. Protecting an author's privacy is achieved by giving the author the
exclusive right to make and distribute copies. See id. Protecting the right of first
publication gives the author the control to withhold publication of a particular
work until the author decides to allow public distribution. See id.
48. See id.
49. See 17 I SC. 88 101-90.3 (1994), Under the Coynright Act. the convright
owner receives a "bundle" of exclusive rights, which includes the right to
reproduce the original and to prepare derivative works based on this work. See id.
50. See id. § 106.
51. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361
(1991); Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1997).
52. See Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1992)
(concluding that toy designer was not entitled to preliminary injunction against
competitor without evidence that it intentionally copied designer's trade dress).
7
Sous: The SAT I  No Laughing Matter for Seinfeld: Issues of Copyright I
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
412 VLLANOVA SPORTS & ENr. LAw JouRNAL
unlawful appropriation. '5 3 Actual copying is demonstrated
through direct or indirect evidence of copying.5 4 Once copying is
established, a demonstration that the copying was improper or un-
lawful is achieved by showing that the second work bears "substan-
tial similarity" to protected expression in the original work.55
Courts rely on the Second Circuit's "substantial similarity" test
set forth in Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc.56 for ana-
lyzing a copyright infringement claim. In Ringgold, the copyright
owner alleged that the defendant's use of a "story quilt" as a set
decoration in a television program infringed on the owner's copy-
right in the "Church Picnic Story Quilt. '5 7 The Ringgold court set
forth two components as the basis of the substantial similarity test:
(1) a quantitative threshold and (2) a qualitative threshold.58
While the two Ringgold components serve as a guide in establishing
substantial similarity, a court must then decide how to determine
these quantitative and qualitative elements.
First, to determine that the quantitative threshold has been
met, courts must decide whether to analyze the copied material sep-
arately or in the aggregate.59 The Second Circuit's decision in Twin
Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications International, Ltd.60 supports the
aggregate analysis.61 Twin Peaks Productions, Inc., the owner of
the trademark for the copyrighted television series Twin Peaks, sued
53. Id.
54. See id. at 140. Evidence of copying includes access to copyrighted work,
similarities between the works, and expert testimony. See id. Only after actual
copying has been established does the plaintiff proceed to establish that the copy-
ing was improper or unlawful. See Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g
Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Repp, 132 F.2d at 889;
Laureyssens, 964 F.2d at 140).
55. See Repp, 132 F.3d at 889; see also Laureyssens, 964 F.2d at 140.
56. 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997).
57. Id. at 73. The plaintiff, Faith Ringgold, was an artist who created and
owned a copyright in "story quilt." Id. at 71. "Story quilt" is an example of a new
type of artistic expression, which was designed by Ringgold. See id, at 72. The
defendants, Black Entertainment Television, Inc. and Home Box Office, Inc., pro-
duced a television series called "ROC" in which a "story quilt" poster was used in
the set decoration. See id. Ringgold alleged that the defendants infringed her
copyright in "Church Picnic Story Quilt" because the use of the poster in the epi-
sode of "ROC" was unauthorized. See Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 73.
58. See id. at 74-75. Substantial similarity requires that "[t)he copying is quan-
titatively and qualitatively sufficient to support the legal conclusion that infringe-
ment (actionable copying) has occurred. The qualitative component concerns the
copying of expression, rather than ideas .... The quantitative component gener-
ally concerns the amount of copyrighted work that is copied .. . ." Id.
59. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 138.
60. 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993).
61. See id. at 1372-73.
[Vol. 6: p. 405
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Publications International, Ltd., a book author and publisher, for
alleged copyright and trademark infringement.62 In determining
whether substantial similarity was present, the Second Circuit relied
on an aggregate analysis.
63
In Craft v. Kobler,64 the court utilized the same aggregate analy-
sis as the Twin Peaks Productions court used to establish substantial
similarity between the two works. 65 The owner of copyrighted
books about a composer brought a copyright infringement suit
against the author of a biography of the composer. 66 Like the Sec-
ond Circuit in Twin Peaks Productions, the Craft court treated the
amount of unauthorized copying cumulatively in finding copyright
infringement.67
Second, in order to show that both the qualitative and the
quantitative thresholds have been satisfied, courts must evaluate
whether the copied material includes creative expression as op-
posed to discovered facts. 6a In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tele-
phone Service Co., Inc.,69  the Second Circuit explored this
distinction. 70 In Feist, the court recognized the basic principle that
62. See id. at 1366. The plaintiff owned the unregistered trademark TWIN
PEAKS. See id. at 1370. The defendant, Publications International, Ltd., published
"Welcome to Twin Peaks: A Complete Guide to Who's Who and What's What" (the
"Book") based on eight episodes of the Twin Peaks television series. See id.
63. See Twin Peaks Prods., 996 F.2d at 1372. The court examined the evidence
of actual copying and found that two chapters of the Book included direct quota-
tions from the episodes, and 89 lines of dialogue were taken from the original
work. See id. The aggregate analysis used by the court continued with the evidence
that Chapter Three of the Book was an explicit recounting of eight episodes of the
television program; furthermore, the Book contained the same sequence of plot
twists as the teleplays. See id. at 1372-73.
64. 667 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
65. See id. at 124-25.
66. See id. at 120. In Craft, the plaintiff was the author or co-author of about
15 books on Stravinsky. See id. at 122. The defendant, Kobler, was a professional
writer who wrote a book called Firebird See id. Firebird contained quotes by Stravin-
sky extracted from Craft-Stravinsky literature. See id
67. See Craft, 667 F. Supp. at 124-25. The plaintiff showed 72 examples of
where Kobler's book copied or directly quoted from Craft's copyrighted material.
See id. at 124. Overall, there were 79 infringements by quotation of passages. See
id. In addition, the court found 10 other passages where the defendant para-
phrased the mode of expression that was protected by Craft's copyright. See id.
The overall copying from Craft's literature bout Stravinsky upportred a finding of
infringement. See id, at 124-25.
68. See Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d
Cir. 1997).
69. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
70. See id. at 364. In Feist, the plaintiff, Rural Telephone Service Company
("Rural"), a certified public utility providing telephone service, published a tele-
phone directory with both white and yellow pages. See id. at 342. The defendant,
Feist Publications, Inc. ("Feist"), published an area-wide telephone directory. See
413
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facts are not entitled to copyright protection because they do not
owe their origin to an act of authorship; therefore, the copying of
such facts does not constitute infringement. 71 Consistent with its
decision in Feist, the Second Circuit supported the conclusion that
discovered facts are not protected expression in Horgan v. Macmil-
lan, InC.7 2 The Horgan court explained that copyright infringement
does not turn on whether the original can be recreated from the
copy but whether the copy is substantially similar to the original. 73
id. Rural brought a copyright infringement suit against Feist for using listings in its
local white pages. See id.
71. See Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 347. Facts and factual compilations re-
ceive disparate treatment. See id. "No one may claim originality as to facts." Id
(quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, Co'vmcHT § 2.11 [A], at 2-157
(1990) [hereinafter NIMMER]). The distinction is drawn between creation and dis-
covery. See id. For instance, the person who first finds and reports a certain fact
has not created the fact but has only discovered it. See id. Another example of this
distinction involves census takers who do not create population figures but merely
copy them. See Feist Publs., 499 U.S. at 347 (citing Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in
Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L.
REv. 516, 525 (1981)).
72. 789 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1986). The plaintiff in Horgan owned a copyright in
choreography for a ballet. See id. at 157. The defendants authored a book that
contained photographs of the ballet performance. See id. Plaintiff brought a copy-
right infringement suit against the defendants, who claimed that the still photo-
graphs were not substantially similar to the original work because they did not
"capture the flow of movement, which is the essence of dance .. . ." Id. at 161-62.
73. See id. at 162. It is important to note that, when the facts of cases change,
courts may use several tests other than the quantitative and qualitative approach to
determine substantial similarity, such as: (1) the ordinary observer test; (2) the
total concept and feel test; and (3) the fragmented literal similarity test. See Castle
Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 139-41 (2d
Cir. 1998).
The ordinary observer test asks whether: "[t]wo works are substantially similar
where 'the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be
disposed to overlook them, and regard [the] aesthetic appeal [of the two works] as
the same.'" Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1072 (2d Cir. 1992) (quot-
ing Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960)).
Under the total concept and feel test, the analysis considers "the similarities in
such aspects as the total concept and feel, theme, characters, plot, sequence, pace,
and setting" of the original and the allegedly infringing copies. See Williams v.
Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 588 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Reyher v. Children's Television
Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1976).
Lastly, the fragmented literal similarity test examines the copying of direct
quotations and paraphrasing. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 140 (citing 4 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON CoPMrGrrr § 13.03 [A] [1], at 13-29,
§ 13.03 [A] [2], at 13-45 (1997) [hereinafter NIMMER I]); see also Twin Peaks Prods.,
Inc. v. Publications Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1372-73 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying
Nimmer test); Warner Bros. Inc. v. American Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 240, 242
(2d Cir. 1983) (same).
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B. Fair Use
Under the Copyright Act, the fair use doctrine fulfills the copy-
right's goal of promoting the "Progress of Science and useful
Arts."74 The doctrine of fair use originated from the common law
Statute of Anne in 1710. 75 As reasoned by English judges, the doc-
trine's purpose is to allow a second author, in spite of the first au-
thor's copyright, to base a new work on the author's original for the
public benefit. 76 The fair use concept is intended to limit the pur-
view of the copyright monopoly in an effort to allow for the stimula-
tion of original and creative works.77
Although the purpose of the fair use doctrine is clear, the diffi-
culty lies in defining the scope of its application.78 In examining a
fair use question, courts look to a set of formulations originally ar-
ticulated by Justice Story in Folsom v. Marsh79 and later codified in
the Copyright Act.8 0 This set of formulations, found in Section 107
of the Copyright Act, includes four general factors to be evaluated
in determining whether the use made of a work is fair use. 81 The
74. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
75. See Marks, supra note 7, at 1381. From 1740 to 1839, English judges cre-
ated a set of principles that controlled the use of an author's copyrighted works by
another author. See id, Such principles formed the basis for the fair use doctrine.
See id,; see also Leval, supra note 3, at 1105.
76. See Marks, supra note 7, at 1381. Courts recognized that some unauthor-
ized reproductions of copyrighted material would not constitute infringement of
the author's rights; first called "fair abridgement," this concept later became
known as "fair use." Leval, supra note 3, at 1105. See generally W. PATRY, THE FAIR
USE PRIVILEGE IN CopyiGHT LAw 6-17 (1985).
77. See Leval, supra note 3, at 1110. The introductory language of the Copy-
right Act illustrates that fair use may apply to educational purposes "'such as criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research.'" Id.
(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982)).
78. See id. at 1105.
79. 9 F.Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). Justice Story's summary of
how to approach the fair use concept is as follows: "In short, we must often ...
look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the
materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or dimin-
ish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work." Id. at 348.
80. See Leval, supra note 3, at 1105. Congress codified the common law con-
cept of fair use in the Copyright Act: "[t] he fair use of a copyrighted work... for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copy-
right." 17 U.S.C. § 107.
81. See Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d
132, 141 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107). The four factors include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; . . . and (4)
11
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four factors are intended to guide, but not control, the fair use
analysis because fair use will always be considered in light of the
primary objective of copyright law "to promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts."82 For this reason, fair use analysis proceeds
on a case-by-case basis, throughout which courts receive little gui-
dance; therefore, courts often turn to notions of fairness.8 3
1. Purpose and Character of the Use Factor
The first factor of the fair use doctrine concerns the purpose
or character of the use.8 4 A subset of this factor is whether the use
of the work is of "a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educa-
tional purposes."85 In addition, when considering fair use under
this factor, courts make an even more important inquiry as to
whether and to what degree the allegedly infringing work is
"transformative. 86
The challenged use is "transformative" when the allegedly in-
fringing work does not "merely supersede" the original work but
instead "adds something new," which has the effect of conferring
value on the original work.8 7 For instance, a quotation of copy-
righted material that only serves to "repackage" or "republish" the
original work will not meet the fair use standard.88 Thus, "trans-
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107.
82. Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 141. (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994)). The fair use examples given in the Copyright Act
are " ' illustrative and not limitative.'" Id. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78).
83. See id. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577). Many courts do not share a
similar view of the meaning of fair use, which leads to decisions that do not neces-
sarily follow consistent principles. See Leval, supra note 3, at 1106-07.
84. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
85. Id.
86. Campbell 510 U.S. at 579 (quoting Leval, supra note 3, at 1111).
87. See Leval, supra note 3, at 1111. Furthermore, if:
[t]he secondary use adds value to the original - if the quoted matter is
used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new information,
new aesthetics, new insights and understandings - this is the very type of
activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of
society.
Id.
88. See id. In this way, the material only "supersedes the objects" of the origi-
nal work. See id. (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)
(No. 4901)). To illustrate a non-transformative use, the Twin Peaks Productions case
is helpful. See Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366,
1370 (1993). According to the Second Circuit, the book about the Twin Peaks
television series, detailing specific plots and depicting characters, served no trans-
formative purpose and included more detail than required to serve a legitimate
purpose. See id. at 1376. The court held that the book about the Twin Peaks televi-
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formative" use of the original work is imperative under this factor,
but it is not determinative for a finding of fair use because this fac-
tor must be weighed in conjunction with the remaining three
factors.8 9
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work Factor
The second factor considers the nature of the copyrighted
work.90 This factor protects the incentives of authorship, sug-
gesting that some works are closer to copyright protection than
others.91 Although this factor can be less important when analyzed
in relation to certain transformative uses, it is nevertheless relevant
in some cases for a complete fair use analysis. 92 The important is-
sue underlying this factor is whether the nature of the copyrighted
work is a collection of facts rather than a creative or imaginative
work.93
In Stewart v. Abend,94 the Supreme Court held that the scope of
fair use is narrower for fictional works than for factual works.95 In
applying the second factor, the Court relied on the Ninth Circuit's
analysis to determine that fair use is "more likely to be found in
sion series discussing the show's characters, actors, and plots with trivia questions
about the show was not fair use. See id. at 1378.
89. See Leval, supra note 3, at 1116. Leval states that the first factor is the "soul
of fair use." Id. Nonetheless, Leval recognizes the importance of weighing this
factor against the others, keeping in mind the copyright owner's incentives and
ownership rights. See id
90. See Campbell 510 U.S. at 586.
91. See id This factor "calls for recognition that some works are closer to the
core of intended copyright protection than others, with the consequence that fair
use is more difficult to establish when the former works are copied." Id
92. See id. (concluding that this factor was not helpful in determining fair use
when it is parody case because parodies almost always copy expressive works).
93. See Lyras, supra note 36, at 182. When the copyrighted material is a collec-
tion of facts, the fair use doctrine allows a more liberal use of copyrighted works.
See id Additionally, a great public interest in the copyrighted material may allow
more freedom in using the original work without explicit consent from the author.
See id. (citing Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broad. Cos., 621
F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980)).
94. 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
95. See id. at 237. The holder of rights in a magazine story brought an in-
fringement action against the holders of rights in a motion picture that had been
created from the story. See id at 207. The district court granted relief in favor of
the holders of rights in the motion picture, secondary users of the copyrighted
work. See id The district court's copyright infringement analysis was based upon
the fair use defense. See id The Ninth Circuit later reversed this decision, and the
Ninth Circuit's decision was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court. See Stew-
art, 495 U.S. at 207. According to the Supreme Court, the motion picture's use of
the story was not fair use because it failed to meet the four criteria of the fair use
defense. See id
13
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factual works than in fictional works."96 The Court characterized
the motion picture titled "Rear Window," which was based on a fic-
tional work, "It Had to Be Murder," as a fictional rather than factual
work.97 According to the Court, the motion picture did not meet
the other three factors and, therefore, the fair use defense ulti-
mately was not applicable.98
Another illustrative fair use case, Twin Peaks Productions, favors
copyright protection for creative fictional works.99 The Second Cir-
cuit recognized the copyrighted television program as a work of fic-
tion. 100 The court held that, when evaluating the nature of the
copyrighted work, there is a bias in favor of fictional works. 10 1 In
keeping with this idea, the court found that the book was a fictional
work, and thereby concluded that the book was not fair use of the
teleplays. 102
3. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used Factor
The third factor evaluated in the fair use defense concerns the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole.' 0 3 Generally, the more copyrighted
information used in the secondary work, the greater the conflict
96. Id. (citing NIMMER, § 13.05[A], at 13-77, 13-78). The court stated that "[a]
use is less likely to be deemed fair when the copyrighted work is a creative prod-
uct." Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1481 (1988) (citing Brewer v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 749 F.2d 527, 529 (1984)). "The law generally recognizes a greater
need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy." Stewart v.
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Na-
tion Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985)).
97. See Stewart, 495 U.S. at 211-12, 238.
98. See id. at 238. In evaluating the first factor, the Court stated that "[e]very
[unauthorized] commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair
exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright."
Id. at 237 (quoting Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
451 (1984)). As to the third factor, the Court relied on the Court of Appeals'
determination that the motion picture contained a substantial portion of the story,
including the story's unique setting, characters, plot, and sequence of events. See
id. at 238. As to the fourth factor, the Court again relied on the Court of Appeals'
conclusion that the re-release of the film impinged on the market potential of new
versions of the story. See id. Consequently, the Court concluded that all four fac-
tors make this case a traditional example of unfair use. See Stewart, 495 U.S. at 238.
99. See Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1376
(1993). For a discussion of the facts, see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
100. See Twin Peaks Prods., 996 F.2d at 1376. In response to the court's catego-
rization of the work as a fictional work, the secondary user argued that the public
reaction to the televised programs made the teleplays a fact. See id
101. See id. (citing Stewart, 495 U.S. at 237-38); see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S.
at 563; NIMMER I, supra note 73, § 13.05[A] [2], at 13-102.22 & n.28.7.
102. See Twin Peaks Prods., 996 F.2d at 1366.
103. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1982).
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with the copyright owner, and the less chance it will be protected
under the fair use doctrine. 10 4 An important inquiry when examin-
ing this factor is the consideration of the context from which the
material is taken.' 0 5 In following this inquiry, courts often focus on
whether the copying is consistent with "or more than necessary to
further the purpose and character of the use."106
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,107 the
Supreme Court balanced the extent of the copyrighted material
taken with the nature of the work in favor of the secondary user.1 8
The Court found that although the entire work is reproduced, "it
does not have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of
fair use." 10 9 Weighing the remaining three factors against an "equi-
table rule of reason," the Court found that the secondary work con-
stituted fair use.110
In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,11 ' the
amount of work used was an unsubstantial portion of the infringing
work.112 Consequently, the Supreme Court denied Nation Enter-
prises' claim of fair use under the Copyright Act.113 The Court's
fair use analysis focused on the four factors identified by Congress
as integral to the determination of fair use.'1 4 Although the
amount of taking was unsubstantial in relation to the work as a
whole, the district court concluded that Nation Enterprises took
104. See Leval, supra note 3, at 1122.
105. See Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d
132, 144 (2d Cir. 1998).
106. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586-87 (1994).
107. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Universal City Studios, Inc., the owner of copy-
rights on television programs, brought a copyright infringement action against
Sony Corporation of America, the manufacturers of home videotape recorders.
See id.
108. See id. at 449-52.
109. Id. at 450. In finding fair use, the Court considered the nature of a tele-
vised copyrighted audiovisual work and the fact that time shifting allows the viewer
to see a work which can be viewed for no charge. See id at 449.
110. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 454-55. The dissent understood fair use as allowing
authors to copy small portions of original works for the advancement of their own
creative pursuits. See id at 497-98. Accordingly, the dissenters claimed that time
shifting does not fall into this category; furthermore, the duplication involved in
time shifting would prevent a finding of fair use. See id.
111. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
112. See id. at 565.
113. See id. at 539. The respondents, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., sued the
petitioners, Nation Enterprises, for an unauthorized publication of quotes from
President Ford's memoirs. See id.
114. See id. at 560-61.
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what was "essentially the heart of the book."115 For this reason, in
light of the expressive value of the quotes used, the Court held that
this taking, in conjunction with the other factors, did not constitute
fair use.116
4. Effect of the Use on the Market Factor
The final factor considers the effect that the unauthorized use
will have on the market for the primary work."1 7 Underlying this
factor is the acknowledgment that copyright is not an inherent
right in authorship. 118 The idea behind copyright is to allow au-
thors the chance to garner rewards by encouraging them to create
works.119 A secondary user's gross interference with an author's
pursuits would undermine this goal of copyright.' 20
In evaluating this factor, courts consider whether the secon-
dary work usurps or substitutes for the market of the original
work.' 21 In New Era Publications International v. Carol Publishing
Group,'22 the Second Circuit examined this important considera-
tion.' 23 The court acknowledged that, although a copyrighted work
or its derivative has the potential to harm the market, it will not
cause harm if the secondary work does not compete with the origi-
nal work.124 The court held that unfair use is not present when the
115. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564-65. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit overruled the district court's analysis of the qualitative component of the
taking. See id. A Time magazine editor described the chapters used as "the most
interesting and moving parts of the entire manuscript." Id.
116. See id. at 539, 569.
117. See Leval, supra note 3, at 1124. An important inquiry is whether "[t]he
use tends to interfere with the sale of the copyrighted article." Mura v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., 245 F. Supp. 587, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
118. See Leval, supra note 3, at 1124. According to Leval, if copyright were a
natural right, the potential impact on the market of unauthorized use would be
insignificant and thus, "[a]ny unauthorized taking would be obnoxious." Id.
119. See id,
120. See id. See generally Marsh, supra note 37, at 659-61 (discussing potential
harm to market). Additionally, "it would ... not serve the ends of the Copyright
Act - i.e., to advance the arts - if artists were denied their monopoly over derivative
works merely because they made the artistic decision not to saturate those markets
with variations of their original." Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publ'g
Group, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
121. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994).
122. 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1990).
123. See id. The plaintiff, New Era Publications International, brought a copy-
right infringement action against defendant, Carol Publishing Group, for publish-
ing a critical biography of L. Ron Hubbard, founder of the Church of Scientology.
See id at 153. New Era Publications holds licenses of all of Hubbard's works. See id
at 154.
124. See id at 160. Supporting this view, the court stated that "'where the
copy does not compete in any way with the original ... that creation will be dis-
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secondary use harms the market, but nonetheless serves as criti-
cism, a work the Copyright Act aims to protect.125
Lastly, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,126 the Supreme
Court discussed another relevant qualification to the market fac-
tor.127 Rather than protecting subsequent critical works, this quali-
fication protects aspects of the original work that the author or
others would develop. 128 According to this distinction, the Court
found no evidence of potential market harm by a rap parody of
"Oh Pretty Woman," and held that the parody titled "Pretty Wo-
man" constituted a fair use. 129
IV. NARRATwE ANALYSIS
In Castle Rock, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed
two issues: copyright infringement and the fair use defense.' 30 Spe-
cifically, the court considered whether The SAT took sufficient pro-
tected expression from Seinfeld as to infringe the copyright in
Seinfeld and whether The SAT constituted fair use of Seinfeld.'3' The
court granted relief for the copyright infringement claim and re-
jected the fair use defense. 132 The court first analyzed the copy-
right infringement claim and then considered the fair use
defense. 133
couraged if demand can be undercut by copiers' is absent," New Era Publications,
904 F.2d at 160 (quoting Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Gen. Signal
Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1051 (2d Cir. 1983)). The court noted that the book's criti-
cal purpose (to expose Hubbard as a charlatan) was antithetical to the purpose of
an authorized biography that New Era might publish. See id.
125. See id.
126. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
127. See id. at 592. The respondent, Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., sued petitioners,
Campbell and others, for infringing Acuff-Rose's copyright in "Oh, Pretty Woman"
by recording the rap song "Pretty Woman." Id. at 569.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 591-93; see also supra note 127. Copyright law does not recognize
a derivative market for critical works such as a parody. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at
592.
130. See Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d
132, 135 (2d Cir. 1998).
131. See id
132. See id. The District Court for the Southern District of New York awarded
damages for the copyright infringement claim and permanently enjoined the de-
fendants from publishing The SAT See id
133. See id& at 137, 141.
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A. Copyright Infringement Claim
The court first considered the copyright infringement issue.13 4
The first element of a prima facie case of copyright infringement,
actual copying, was undisputed because not only did Castle Rock
own valid copyrights in Seinfeld, but Carol Publishing and Golub ad-
mitted that they actually copied from Seinfeld episodes in creating
The SAT.135 Since the first element of actual copying was undis-
puted, the Second Circuit proceeded to determine whether The
SATs copying of Seinfeld was unlawful or improper by relying on the
"substantial similarity" test established in Ringgold.13 6
First, the court considered the quantitative element of the
"substantial similarity" test.137 This element requires that the
amount of copyrighted work be more than "de minimis." 13 8 The
court undertook an aggregate analysis to determine the amount the
defendant had copied. 39 Considering all the Seinfeld episodes as a
single work, the court concluded that the 643 fragments copied
from Seinfeld exceeded Ringgolds quantitative threshold.1 40
Next, the district court examined the qualitative component of
the Ringgold test.141 Regarding this element, the district court
stated that The SAT copied from Seinfelds creative expression and
not from unprotected facts. 142 The Second Circuit concluded that
because the Seinfeld characters and events originated from the imag-
ination of the show's authors, The SAT copied creative expression
protected by copyright.143 The court found that Castle Rock had
134. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 137.
135. See id. Golub conceded that she made The SAT by taking notes of the
Seinfeld episodes as they aired on television. See id. In addition, Golub reviewed
videotapes of the episodes she and her friends had recorded. See id.
136. See id. at 138. For a discussion of the Ringgold test, see supra note 58 and
accompanying text. In addition, for a discussion of the Copyright Act, see supra
notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
137. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 138.
138. Id.
139. See id. The court decided not to analyze separately the amount of copy-
ing taken from each Seinfeld episode. See id. Rather the Court analyzed the aggre-
gate amount copied from the 84 Seinfeld episodes. See id. at 139.
140. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 138. The court noted that the defendants
would have had a better argument under the "de minimis" standard if they had
copied fragments from a multitude of unrelated television programs. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 138-39. The facts tested in The SAT were taken from the ficti-
tious expression of Seinfeld. See id. at 139. For instance, The SAT did not test read-
ers on true facts about the Seinfeld characters. See id. Rather it tested readers on
events involving the fictitious characters from the Seinfeld episodes. See Castle Rock,
150 F.3d at 139.
143. See id.
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sufficiently established both the quantitative and qualitative compo-
nents of the "substantial similarity" test necessary to find copyright
infringement by Carol Publishing and Golub.144
B. Fair Use Claim
The defendants' claim of fair use defense under the Copyright
Act constituted a second issue in this appeal. 145 The fair use de-
fense considers four factors in light of the general goal underlying
copyright law - to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts. 146 The court evaluated each of the following statutory factors
in detail: (1) purpose and character of the use; (2) nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) amount and substantiality of the portion
used; and (4) effect of the use on the market. 147
The Second Circuit began its analysis by explaining that it
placed little weight on the fact that The SATs use was for commer-
cial gain. 148 Instead, the court proceeded to the more important
inquiry: whether and to what extent The SAT was transformative. 149
The defendants contended that The SAT contained two "transform-
ative" qualities. 150 First, the defendants claimed that, even though
the subject matter is ordinary, The SAT is just as eligible for fair use
as a book testing one's knowledge of Shakespeare. 151 In addition,
the defendants contended that The SAT was "a quintessential exam-
ple of the critical text of the TV environment.. . .152 In response,
Castle Rock disregarded these arguments, considering them "post
hoc rationalizations." 5 3 The court concluded that The SAT com-
pletely lacked transformative purpose because its "repackaging" of
Seinfeld only minimally altered Seinfeld's creative expression. 54
The court next examined whether the second factor, the na-
ture of the copyrighted work, favored Castle Rock or Carol Publish-
144. See id,
145. See id at 141. For a discussion of the fair use defense, see supra notes 74-
83 and accompanying text.
146. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 141.
147. See id at 14146. For a more detailed discussion of these four factors and
their application, see supra notes 84-129 and accompanying text.
148. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 142. The court disregarded this issue, com-
nI1r11a£ use vefsus nonprofit use, by assering that the co.......ercial use of De T
would not favor a finding of fair use. See id.
149. See id For a discussion of the "transformative" element, see supra notes
87-89 and accompanying text.
150. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 142.
151. See id
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See id, at 143.
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ing and Golub. 15 5 The nature of the copyrighted work should be
closer to the central purpose of the intended copyright protection
than other works. 156 The defendants conceded that a narrower
scope of the fair use doctrine exists for fictional works, like Seinfeld,
than for factual works. 15 7 The court found the fictional content of
The SAT irrelevant where this use was minimally transformative and
held in favor of Castle Rock on this point. 158
The third factor under the fair use analysis is the amount and
substantiality of the part used in the secondary work in relation to
the whole original work. 159 The court examined The SATwithin the
context of Seinfeld to find that the purpose of The SAT was not for
commentary, but simply for entertainment. 160 Absent a critical or
transformative purpose, The SAT could not be considered fair use
under this factor. 161
The final factor of the fair use analysis used by the Castle Rock
court contemplated the effect of the use on the market. 16 2 Carol
Publishing and Golub claimed that Castle Rock provided no evi-
dence of actual market harm to Seinfeld by The SAT. 163 The court
concluded that The SAT served as a substitute for a market Castle
Rock could potentially utilize. 164 According to this reasoning, the
court held in favor of Castle Rock on this factor. 165
Balancing the four statutory factors, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals held that Carol Publishing and Golub's fair use defense
155. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 143.
156. See id. For a discussion of the nature of copyrighted work, see supra notes
90-102 and accompanying text.
157. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 143. For a discussion of the difference be-
tween fictional works and factual works, see supra notes 94-102 and accompanying
text.
158. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 144.
159. See id.
160. See id. The court stated that the defendants could have argued that The
SAT demonstrated the "nothingness" of Seinfeld through its numerous examples.
See id. The court considered the use of 643 trivia questions and concluded that The
SAT qualified as entertainment rather than commentary. See id. Commentary
would not have required so many questions to make the point. See Castle Rock, 150
F.3d at 144.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 138-39. On the other hand, Carol Publishing claimed that
Seinfelds audience increased after The SATs publication. See id. Furthermore,
Carol Publishing claimed that Castle Rock showed no interest in publishing a book
like The SAT. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 144-45.
164. See i& at 145. The court concisely stated that "[t]he SAT is likely to fill a
market niche that Castle Rock would in general develop." Id (emphasis added).
165. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 146.
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lacked merit.166 Furthermore, the copyright law's objective would
be undermined by allowing The SAT to copy from Seinfeld.' 67
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals' interpretation of both
the copyright infringement claim and the application of the fair use
defense comported with the aim of the Copyright Act - "to pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."'1
68
A. Copyright Infringement
The Castle Rock court correctly assessed the copyright infringe-
ment claim by applying the two components of the "substantial sim-
ilarity" test established in Ringgold'69 These two elements enable
courts to determine whether the copying meets the quantitative
and qualitative threshold requisite to support a conclusion of in-
fringement.170 Substantial similarity between the original work and
the secondary work composes the crucial issue for a finding of copy-
right infringement.' 7 1 In the past, to assess copyright infringement
claims, the Second Circuit repeatedly applied a more general ver-
sion of the Ringgold test.' 72
In establishing the quantitative threshold, the Second Circuit's
use of an aggregate analysis in determining the copyrighted
amount may seem unwarranted. 173 The Castle Rock court stated that
Section 106 of the Copyright Act "speaks in the singular" when re-
ferring to the allegedly infringed work which supports an "individ-
166. See id.
167. See id. For a discussion of the objectives of copyright law, see supra notes
41-48 and accompanying text.
168. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For a discussion of the copyright infringe-
ment and fair use defense issues, see supra notes 41-129 and accompanying text.
169. See Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d
Cir. 1997). For a discussion of the two components of the Ringgold "substantial
similarity" test, see supra note 58 and accompanying text.
170. See Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 75.
171. See Castie Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group. Inc.. 150 F.3d
132, 137 (2d Cir. 1998).
172. The Second Circuit applied this test in the following cases: Twin Peaks
Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1372-73 (2d Cir. 1993); Hor-
gan v. Macmillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 1986); Craft v. Kobler, 667 F.
Supp. 120, 123-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
173. See Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, Court Twice Rejects 'Fair Use'De-
fense, N.Y. LAw JouRNAL, Aug. 26, 1998, at 3 (stating that Copyright Act supports
individual-episode analysis, not aggregate analysis).
425
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ual-episode analysis." 174 The aggregate analysis, however, was
appropriately applied in Castle Rock. Therefore, the Castle Rock
court was justified in rejecting the "individual-episode analysis" in
favor of the aggregate analysis, which the court noted was sup-
ported by precedent. 175 By analyzing the quantitative element with
a different standard, the court correctly concluded that The SAT
crossed the "de minimis" threshold.176
In deciding that The SAT satisfied Ringgolds qualitative compo-
nent, the Second Circuit correctly found that The SAT copied origi-
nal and protected expression in Seinfeld.177 Moreover, the court
drew an illustrative analogy to Horgan,178 which applied a useful
standard in determining copyright infringement.179 The standard
adopted by the Castle Rock court examined whether the alleged in-
fringing work was substantially similar to the original work and not
whether the original could be recreated from the copy.180 In draw-
ing this distinction outlined in Horgan, the Second Circuit deter-
mined that copyright infringement had occurred.181 Additionally,
the Castle Rock court found that the qualitative component satisfied
the necessary threshold for a finding of substantial similarity.1 82
This conclusion manifests the court's proper use and application of
Ringgolds substantial similarity test.18 3
B. Fair Use
To clarify the nebulous doctrine of fair use, Congress provided
a four-factor framework in Section 107 of the Copyright Act.184
This framework, however, provides little guidance as to whether the
174. Flumenbaum & Karp, supra note 173, at 3. Despite the Copyright Act's
language and the Second Circuit's recognition of the "individual-episode analysis,"
the Second Circuit nonetheless used an "aggregate analysis" approach. See id.
175. See id.
176. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 138.
177. See id. at 139.
178. 789 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1986). For a discussion of the facts of this case, see
supra note 72 and accompanying text.
179. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 139.
180. See id In this case, the test was not whether the ballet could be repro-
duced from the photographs but whether the photographs were substantially simi-
lar to the ballet. See id
181. See id. at 136-40.
182. See id. at 139.
183. See Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d
Cir. 1997) (setting forth dual components of substantial similarity test and applica-
tion in copyright infringement claims).
184. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). For a list of the four statutory factors, see
supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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use reaches the permissible level of fair use.' 8 5 The Castle Rock
court focused on the fair use defense by examining the four factors
in conjunction with the general aim of copyright protection es-
poused by the Copyright Act.186 Conceding that no bright-line rule
existed concerning fair use, the Castle Rock court accurately weighed
the non-exclusive factors in light of the overarching goal of copy-
right law. 187 The Second Circuit considered the fair use defense
and properly evaluated the defense under the four factors, remain-
ing true to the underlying purposes of the Copyright Act.
1. Purpose and Character of the Use
The major issue concerning the purpose and character of the
use is whether the alleged copyrighted material is "transformative"
in relation to the original work.188 The "transformative" use con-
cept, while not determinative, is an essential consideration none-
theless.18 9 Determining that the work is "transformative" allows the
court to conclude that a new work was created rather than the alter-
native, that piracy had occurred.190 The Second Circuit's finding
that The SAT did not serve a "transformative" purpose preserved the
creative work in Seinfeld and recognized the need to punish
piracy.1 9 1
The Castle Rock court properly concluded that this factor
weighed against the defendants. The Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decided that The SAT did not serve a "tranformative" purpose
185. See Leval, supra note 3, at 1106 (discussing nature and contours of fair
use concept).
186. See Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d
132, 141-46 (2d Cir. 1998).
187. See id. at 146.
188. See David Goldberg & Robert J. Bernstein, Demi Moore, Dr Seuss and
Seinfeld: Fair Use, N.Y. LAwJouRNAL, May 16, 1997, at 1 (discussing importance of
"transformative" use concept espoused by Judge Pierre N. Leval in his landmark
article "Toward a Fair Use Standard"). For a discussion of the purpose and charac-
ter of the use of copyrighted work, see supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
189. SeeGoldberg & Bernstein, supra note 188, at 1. The existence of a "trans-
formative" purpose does not guarantee a successful claim of fair use. See Leval,
supra note 3, at 1111. The justification for a transformative purpose must super-
sede the remaining factors that favor the copyright holder. See id.
wrote (in discussing what constitutes a "transformative" use and what does not):
[N]o one can doubt that a reviewer may fairly [quote] largely from the
original work, if... [its design be] ... criticism. On the other hand, it is
as clear, that if he thus [quotes] the most important parts of the work,
with a view, not to criticise, but to supersede the use of the original work,
[infringement will be found].
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
191. See Goldberg & Bernstein, supra note 188, at 1.
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because The SATbarely altered the original expression of Seinfeld.192
The court pointed to the fact that The SAT did not add anything
new to the original Seinfeld.193 This holding is justifiable because
the fair use doctrine only protects secondary works that are "trans-
formative. 1 94 The Castle Rock court relied on precedent illustrating
works which served no "transformative" purpose and were not pro-
tected under the fair use doctrine.1 95 The Second Circuit correctly
favored Castle Rock in this instance since The SAT so minimally al-
tered Seinfeld.
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
Courts determine the nature of the copyrighted work on the
basis of whether the copyrighted work is factual or fictional.' 96 The
Castle Rock court found that The SAT qualified as a fictional work.'
97
Seinfeld is a clear example of a fictional work drawing originality
from the creative thoughts of its author.198 Although The SAT is
also fictional, its taking from Seinfeld does not amount to fair use
because it draws its fictional content directly from Seinfeld with little
"transformative" purpose.1 99
The Castle Rock court based its decision on precedent, which
established a difference between factual and fictional works.
200
Courts have analyzed this second factor in terms of whether the
nature of the copyrighted work is factual or fictional. 201 The Castle
192. See Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d
132, 143 (2d Cir. 1998). A "transformative" purpose can add to the creation of
new works "[t]hat draw upon portions of earlier works but endow them with 'new
expression, meaning or message.'" Leval, supra note 3, at 1111.
193. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 143.
194. Leval, supra note 3, at 1111 (discussing role of "transformative" use in
serving copyright law objective).
195. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 143 (citing Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publica-
tions Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1378 (2d Cir. 1993)).
196. See Lyras, supra note 36, at 182. For a discussion of the nature of copy-
righted work, see supra notes 90-102 and accompanying text.
197. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 144. Without much difficulty, the Second
Circuit found that this factor favored Castle Rock because "[t]he fictional nature
of the copyrighted work remains significant in the instant case, where the secon-
dary use is at best minimally transformative." Id,; see also Flumenbaum & Karp,
supra note 173, at 3.
198. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 138-39 (stating that characters and events
"spring from the imagination of Seinfeld's authors").
199. See id. at 143.
200. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) (holding that use of story
in motion picture was not fair use and qualifying motion picture as fictional work);
see also Twin Peaks Prods., 996 F.2d at 1376 (holding that fictional televised pro-
grams did not constitute fair use of teleplays).
201. See Stewart, 495 U.S. at 237.
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Rock court followed this line of reasoning.20 2 Courts rejected the
fair use defense in both Stewart and Twin Peaks Productions, where
the works in question were fictional because they lacked any factual
basis.203
3. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
Assessment of this factor turns on whether the extent of copy-
ing coincides with the purpose and character of its use in light of
the original context.2 0 4 The Castle Rock court properly found that
The SATs use of 643 questions regarding Seinfeld was for entertain-
ment and not for commentary purposes.20 5 The voluminous use of
material from Seinfeld appropriately led the Castle Rock court to con-
clude a finding against fair use under this factor.206
4. Effect of Use on the Market
Lastly, courts examine the effect of the unauthorized use on
the potential market for original works.20 7 Since the prospective
market niches have the potential to harm the copyright holder if
filled by non-copyright holders, the market effect is important.208
The Second Circuit correctly found that The SAT interfered with a
market niche Castle Rock could have developed or contracted with
another to develop.20 9
The Castle Rock court properly relied on precedent, which es-
tablished that when the secondary use does not harm the market
202. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 143-44 (applying factual/fictional works dis-
tinction as utilized by courts in Stewart and Twin Peaks Productions).
203. For a discussion of the facts and holding of Stewart, see supra notes 94-98
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the facts and holding of Twin Peaks
Productions, see supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
204. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 144. For a discussion of the amount and sub-
stantiality factor, see supra notes 103-16.
205. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 144. Defendants argued that The SAT (as a
work of criticism) could not demonstrate Seinfeld's "'nothingness'" without "re-
peated, indeed exhaustive examples deconstructing Seinfeld's humor, thereby em-
phasizing Seinfelds meaninglessness to The SAT's readers." Id.
206. See id. The Second Circuit, in finding that this factor opposed fair use,
concluded that The SAT lacked either a critical or "transformative" purpose. See id.
207. See Leval, sup-a note 3, at 1124. For a discussion of the effect of use on
the market, see supra notes 117-29 and accompanying text.
208. See Leval, supra note 3, at 1124. Leval states that the Supreme Court
deemed this factor as the most significant element in the fair use analysis. See id.
(quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566
(1985)). The market factor derives its importance from the acknowledgement
that copyright is not a natural right innate in authorship. See Leval, supra note 3, at
1124. If copyright were a natural right, the market factor would be nonessential
and any instance of unauthorized taking would be "absurd." Id.
209. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 145-46.
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for the original work, there is a finding of fair use.210 Two cases
that have found in favor of fair use based on the market use factor
are New Era Publications211 and Campbell212 Because both cases in-
volved either a parody or a criticism which did not usurp the mar-
ket for the original work, the works were considered fair use.
2 13
The Second Circuit carefully analyzed the potential market harm
affecting Castle Rock.2 14 Unlike the critical biography in New Era
Publications and the rap parody in Campbell, however, The SAT substi-
tuted for the market of the original work.215 Accordingly, the court
correctly held in favor of Castle Rock with a finding of unfair use,
acknowledging that Congress intended copyright law to protect
economic choice in regard to market niches.2 16
In conclusion, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals fairly
weighed the four statutory factors in light of the underlying aim of
copyright law. The aim of copyright law is to balance the compet-
ing interests of the copyright holder with those of the secondary
user while promoting new creative works.217 The Castle Rock court's
decision promoted this goal. By finding copyright infringement
and rejecting the fair use defense, the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals protected the innovative thoughts and ideas of the original
author.2 18
210. See New Era Publications Int'l v. Carol Publ'g Group, 904 F.2d 152, 160
(2d Cir. 1990) (holding that critical biography did not harm market for comple-
mentary biographies); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
591-93 (1994) (holding that rap parody did not invade or harm market for original
song "Oh, Pretty Woman").
211. 904 F.2d 152, 160 (2d Cir. 1990).
212. 510 U.S. 569, 592-93 (1994).
213. See New Era Publications, 904 F.2d at 160. For a discussion of the facts and
holding of New Era Publications, see supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text; see
also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591-93. For a discussion of the facts and holding of Camp-
bell, see supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
214. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 145-46. Mindful of the aim of the Copyright
Act, the Second Circuit restated the district court's comment that "'[i]t would...
not serve the ends of the Copyright Act - - i.e., to advance the arts - - if the artists
were denied their monopoly over derivative versions of their creative works ... 
Id. at 146.
215. See id. at 145.
216. See id. This idea coincides with the utilitarian concept of copyright law
that "promises authors the opportunity to realize rewards in order to encourage
them to create." Leval, supra note 3, at 1124.
217. See Kreiss, supra note 42, at 6-8 (discussing primary and secondary goals
of copyright law).
218. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 146.
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VI. IMPACT
In Castle Rock, the Second Circuit decided that The SATs pub-
lisher and author committed copyright infringement, and their sec-
ondary work did not constitute a fair "transformative" use of
Seinfeld.219 Courts handling such issues, especially the fair use doc-
trine, are often confronted with difficult decisions. 220 The early de-
velopment of the fair use doctrine failed to articulate a set of
governing principles or values to guide a court's analysis. 22' It was
not until the Copyright Act that the courts received guidance on
how to recognize fair use. 222 The four statutory factors, however,
failed to provide a bright-line rule, and as a result, a significant chal-
lenge was left for the courts. 22 3
The Second Circuit's analysis in this case comported with the
approach it has taken in other copyright infringement cases.224
The Castle Rock decision preserved a copyright holder's exclusive
rights of ownership.2 25 To assess the fair use defense, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals utilized the Copyright Act and precedent
to reach its decision.2 26 The Castle Rock decision provides a useful
example from a line of cases, which have assessed the fair use doc-
219. See id. at 135. For a discussion of the fair use analysis concerning The
SAT, see supra notes 145-67 and accompanying text.
220. See Leval, supra note 3, at 1105-06. The fair use doctrine has presented
difficulties for many courts precisely because of the varying meanings espoused by
judges in the past. See id. at 1106-07. As Leval states in regard to decisions on the
fair use doctrine, "[reversals and divided courts are commonplace." Id. (citing
following leading cases that were reversed at each stage of review: New Era Publica-
tions Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989); Salinger v. Random
House, Inc. 484 U.S. 890 (1987); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539 (1985); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417 (1984); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 385 U.S. 1009
(1967)).
221. See Leval, supra note 3, at 1105.
222. See id. at 1105-06. The Copyright Act incorporated the formulations on
how to identify fair use that Justice Story articulated in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.Cas.
342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). See Leval, supra note 3, at 1105-06.
223. See id. For example, the statute does not offer much direction about the
"purpose and character" of the secondary use; the statute offers no "clues at all" for
evaluating the significance of "the nature of" the copyrighted work; and the statute
fails to establish what are permissive and excessive quantities to establish "market
ha-r." Ud at 1106.
224. See Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 70 (2d
Cir. 1997); Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1366
(2d Cir. 1993); New Era Publications Int'l v. Carol Publ'g Group, 904 F.2d 152, 152
(2d Cir. 1990); Horgan v. Macmillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 157 (2d Cir. 1986); Sony
Corp., 464 U.S. at 417.
225. See Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d
132, 141 (2d Cir. 1998).
226. See id.
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trine in the absence of a clear standard. 227 The lack of a bright-line
rule is a positive and necessary aspect of copyright protection.228
One of the main objectives of the Copyright Act, to prevent a sti-
fling of intellectual activity, is achieved because there is no bright-
line rule.2 29
Overall, the Castle Rock decision bolsters a need for copyright
protection against secondary users who unfairly copy an original au-
thor's creative work.23 0 As a policy consideration, this holding will
not threaten the creation of new works, the promotion of which was
a major aim of the Copyright Act, because The SAT involved mere
copying rather than new creative expression.2 31 For this reason, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals' holding correctly satisfied the
goals of copyright law.23 2 Notwithstanding this court's fair decision,
commentators predict that the competing interests of copyright
holders and secondary users will continue to create a challenging
battle for courts to confront.233
Maria E. Sous
227. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 340
(1991); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 207 (1990); Ringgold 126 F.3d at 78; Twin
Peaks Prods., 996 F.2d at 1374; New Era Publications, 904 F.2d at 156; Horgan, 789
F.2d at 157; Craft v. Kobler, 667 F. Supp. 120, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Folsom v.
Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342, 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
228. See Leval, supra note 3, at 1135-36.
229. See idi Leval stated that "[a] definite standard would champion predict-
ability at the expense ofjustification ... we should not adopt a bright-line standard
unless it were a good one - - and we do not have a good one." Id In 1841,Judge
Story wrote that "[ilt is not easy 'to lay down any general principles applicable to
all cases.'" Id. at 1135.
230. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 136-41.
231. See id at 143 (concluding that The SATminimally altered Seinfeld and had
little "tramsformative purpose").
232. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803 (1994).
233. See Leval, supra note 3, at 1135-36.
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